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Introduction
In December 1970, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) approved a 15,900-word document, Poučení 
z krizového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ (Lessons 
Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the 13th 
Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 31 May–4 June, 1966), 
which constituted the officially sanctioned interpretation of the Prague 
Spring and the Warsaw Pact intervention (20–21 August 1968). The text 
was originally published as a 16-page supplement to the mass-circulation 
Party daily Rudé právo on 14 January 1971, and was subsequently produced 
in bound print-runs of hundreds of thousands of copies up to 1988.1 Precise 
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1  Citations here are from the 48-page first bound edition, Poučení z krizového vývoje ve 
straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ, Prague, 1971, published by Rudé právo, (hereafter, 
Poučení), which includes the supplementary text, Rezoluce k aktuálním otázkám jednoty 
strany (Resolution on Topical Questions of Party Unity). Numerous other editions of Poučení 
were produced from 1971 to 1988, especially by the Prague publishing houses Svoboda and 
SPN, and in Slovak (Poučenie z krízového vývoja v strane a spoločnosti po XIII. zjazde 
KSČ) by Pravda, Bratislava. Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, New 
York, 1989, p. 102, puts the overall print-run of the text at ‘several millions’. Amongst the 
various translations of Poučení were a mass-circulation Russian edition, Uroki krizisnogo 
razvitiia v Kompartii Chekhoslovakii i obshchestve posle XIII s´ ezde KPCh, Moscow, 1971, 
a German edition, Lehren aus der Krisenentwicklung in Partei und Gesellschaft nach dem 
XIII. Parteitag der KPTsch, Prague, 1971, and several English-language editions, including 
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details of its authorship were not made publicly available, but it was written 
by a team of hardline Communists, headed by Vasil Biľak, Chairman 
of the Party’s Ideological Commission from 1968 to 1988, and principal 
spokesman of the so-called zdravé jádro (healthy core) of the Communist 
Party.2 Poučení combined elements of admonishment, ideological credo 
and political manifesto with a potent reaffirmation of the price of non-
compliance. It served both to define the scope of the ‘investigation’ into the 
failings of the past and to justify the measures taken to restore Marxism-
Leninism. Amongst those measures was a seven-month-long process 
of screening Party members, decided upon at a plenum of the Central 
Committee of the KSČ (28–30 January 1970), and announced as ‘a change 
of Party membership cards’, in a two-page letter in Rudé právo, which was 
a forerunner of Poučení in terms of content, language and style.3 
 To this day, Poučení remains synonymous with the policy of 
normalization, and for many Czechs and Slovaks it still has overtly negative 
personal and historical associations. The significance of the text resides 
not in the logic of its argument, or the passion of its appeal, nor less in its 
artistic merits or its stylistic felicity, but in the impression that it made on 
its readership as a perlocutionary act (that is, its effect on its addressees as 
a specific type of ‘speech act’).4 Not even the most zealous of Communists 
could substantiate Biľak’s self-serving claim that it ‘analyses the events of 
the time very deeply and truthfully’.5 It is neither a convincing critique of 
‘anti-Soviet revisionism’, nor is it an especially well crafted or thoughtfully 
conceived document. It is simplistic, tendentious, repetitive and poorly 
structured, and replete with logical fallacies and impressionistic assertions. 
Yet, it faithfully served its two principal purposes — 1) to re-educate, 
Lessons Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the 13th Congress 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Prague, 1971, and more recently Lessons […], 
Prague, 1978. All translations in this article are my own.
2  Biľak’s leading role is confirmed in his unauthorized memoirs, Vasil Biľak, Paměti 
Vasila Biľaka. Unikátní svědectví ze zákulisí KSČ, 2 vols, 2, Prague, 1991, p. 197, and his 
recent slightly expanded authorized posthumous memoirs, Vasil Biľak, Až po mé smrti, 
Prague, 2014, p. 307.
3  Ústřední výbor KSČ, ‘Dopis ÚV KSČ všem základním organizacím a členům 
strany k výměně stranických legitimací KSČ’, Rudé právo, 3 February, 1970, pp. 3–4. The 
letter is reprinted in full in the unattributed volume, Fakta nelze zamlčet. Svědectví lidí a 
dokumentů, 3 vols, 1, Prague, 1971, pp. 36–52.
4  J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford, 1962, p. 101, who introduced 
the concept of perlocution, puts it thus: ‘Saying something will often, or even normally, 
produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the 
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, 
intention, or purpose of producing them.’
5  Biľak, Paměti Vasila Biľaka, 1, p. 7.
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indoctrinate and intimidate its readership, and 2) to satisfy the political 
demands of the Soviet leadership.6 The fact that Poučení was intended for 
a dual audience (which, critically, included the Kremlin) set it apart from 
most other texts of the normalization era and elevated it to the status of a 
canonical work.
 From an early age, Czechoslovak citizens were obliged at least to pretend 
to learn the ‘lesson(s)’ of Poučení. The standard junior school history 
textbook from the 1980s, published in five editions between 1983 and 1989, 
refers to ‘the difficult journey of consolidation’ (a concept increasingly 
preferred to ‘normalization’), and disingenuously describes the treatise as 
‘an in-depth analysis of the reasons for the crisis in the Party and society’.7 
For secondary school children, there was a special edition of Poučení, 
reprinted five times from 1972 to 1988, each with a print-run of 100,000 
copies, including an introduction by Tomáš Slouka, advice on how to use 
the text, a list of twenty-two test questions, suggestions for independent 
work and a vocabulary glossary.8 To reinforce the message, students in 
higher education were required to demonstrate a ‘correct’ understanding 
of Poučení as part of their final state examination. As Zdenek Hejzlar, a 
former member of the Central Committee, has pointed out, people were 
not really meant to discuss Poučení, but had to take it into account (‘muselo 
se vzít na vědomí’).9 
 The dissemination of Poučení marked a definitive phase of the campaign 
against the reforms that followed the Thirteenth Congress of the KSČ. It 
was the most widely distributed propaganda piece since the publication 
of K událostem v Československu (On Events in Czechoslovakia), which 
was originally written in Russian in 1968, and was almost immediately 
translated into Czech and several other languages.10 The text had the 
official approval of different factions within the Central Committee of the 
KSČ, as well as Moscow, and was preferred to Černý’s earlier even more 
6  Its merits were still being officially extolled in Czechoslovakia in 1989, just prior 
to the collapse of Communism. See Jana Perglerová (ed.), Nezažloutlé stránky roku 1968, 
Brno, 1989. Ironically, by the late 1980s, Gorbachev had abandoned Marxism-Leninism, 
although he allowed the Czechoslovak authorities to continue to interpret the events of 
1968 in accordance with Poučení.
7  See, for example, Miloň Dohnal et al., Dějepis pro 8. ročník základní školy, vol. 2, 
Prague, 1987, pp. 96–99.
8  Poučení z krizového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ (Edice: 
Prameny a dokumenty k občanské nauce na škole II. cyklu), Prague, 1972.
9  Zdenek Hejzlar, Praha ve stínu Stalina a Brežněva, Prague, 1991, p. 174.
10  Press Group of Soviet Journalists, K sobitiyam v Chekhoslovakii. Fakty, dokumenty, 
svidetel s´tva pressy i ochevidtsev, Moscow, 1968.
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inflammatory work, Jak se dělá kontrarevoluce (How a Counter-Revolution 
is Plotted), which was subsequently withdrawn from sale.11 The decision to 
publish Poučení as a supplement to Rudé právo, in the first instance, served 
to highlight its unchallengeable status, and simultaneously contributed to 
the reassertion of the role of the media as the mouthpiece for Communist 
orthodoxy. As Paulina Bren has pointed out, ‘The Prague Spring had 
begun — and ended — not as a political revolution but as a revolutionary 
experience of words and images’.12 Poučení was, on the one hand, the last 
word on the ‘subjective’ mistakes of the past, and a final warning that petit-
bourgeois ‘revisionist’ tendencies would no longer be tolerated and, on the 
other, a ‘sign’ of the triumph of authoritarian rule. In semiotic terms, it 
arguably ranked alongside the other permanent ‘symbols’ of Communist 
power, such as the hammer and sickle, statues of Lenin, the red flag, the 
five-pointed red star, the Manifesto of the Communist Party and Fučík’s 
Reportáž psaná na oprátce (Notes from the Gallows).13 
 The metaphorical and literal return to the old order was reinforced by 
the use of language, which in many respects represented a throwback to the 
past. Milan Šimečka puts it thus: 
In its style of argument and language, and its twisting of the facts, it took 
the reader straight back to the 1950s. Reading it, one was reminded of the 
pathos of the prosecution’s impassioned speeches in the hanging trials of 
those days. It succeeded in presenting a version of events totally at variance 
with what millions of people had lived through personally.14 
It is this aspect of the publication, especially the rhetoric employed in the 
deconstruction and reconstruction of reality, which provides the substance 
of this study. The article seeks to show how ‘authoritative discourse’, to 
use Bakhtin’s term,15 is created through a series of rhetorical devices, 
whose aim is not just to influence and cajole, but also to dissemble and 
11  Rudolf Černý, Jak se dělá kontrarevoluce, Prague, 1970.
12  Paulina Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of Communism after the 1968 
Prague Spring, Ithaca, NY and London, 2010, p. 45. 
13  Julius Fučík, Reportáž psaná na oprátce, Prague, 1945, subsequently published in 
numerous editions, tells of life in Pankrác Prison during the German occupation.
14  Milan Simecka, The Restoration of Order: The Normalization of Czechoslovakia, 
London, 1984, p. 75.
15  Mikhail Bakhtin, Four Essays by Mikhail Bakhtin, Austin, TX, 1994, edited and 
introduced by Michael Holquist, translated by Carol Emerson and Michael Holquist. See 
also Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More, Princeton, NJ and 
Oxford, 2005, pp. 14–16.  
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deceive. The Oxford Dictionary of English describes ‘rhetoric’ as ‘language 
designed to have a persuasive or impressive effect, but which is often 
regarded as lacking in sincerity or meaningful content’.16 Poučení was a 
tour de force of covert denialism. It redefined the ‘norms’ of discourse 
by reducing language to an ideological ritual. Even those Czechs and 
Slovaks who viewed the document with disdain and derision understood 
its ‘coded’ message. It was an uncompromising and immutable assertion 
of the requirement to toe the Party line, and it established the context and 
stylistic parameters of all other forms of political discourse. Like the texts 
of the early 1950s, it offered no scope for interpretation; it silenced other 
viewpoints and it was stylistically unrefined. Unlike those texts, however, 
it did not exhort violent retribution; it left some space for rehabilitation and 
reconciliation (at least for people who were largely passive sympathizers 
of reform), and it moderated its tub-thumping. Gone are most of the 
emotive designations, such as sabotér (saboteur), spiklenec (conspirator), 
špion (spy), štváč (agitator) and záškodník (terrorist), which had 21, 67, 
114, 41 and 37 occurrences per million (ppm), respectively, in the 1952 
sub-corpus of Slovník komunistické totality (The Dictionary of Communist 
Totalitarianism, hereafter, SKT).17 Gone too are the more hysterical phrases 
of Stalinist propaganda, such as hnusný zrádce (disgusting traitor) and 
krvavý pes (bloody dog [used mainly of Tito]). 
 There is no definitive taxonomy of totalitarian rhetoric, but John 
Wesley Young has enumerated a number of the most common examples: 
dogmatic deduction, questionably unquestionable statements, bandwagon 
language, isms in Communist propaganda, ironic quotation marks, 
pejorative prefixes, elastic words, euphemistic expression and Aesopian 
language.18 Some need little explanation, but the meaning of others is not 
so transparent. ‘Dogmatic deduction’ relates to the drawing of conclusions 
on the basis of suspect propositions presented as the absolute truth. An 
example in Poučení is the claim that the opposition to the foundations of 
socialism reflected the success of rightist propaganda in persuading honest 
working people that the battle was between progressive and conservative 
Communists, rather than being a manifestation of the class struggle. 
16  Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (eds), Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford, 
2006, 2nd edn.
17  František Čermák, Václav Cvrček and Věra Schmiedtová (eds), Slovník komunistické 
totality, Prague, 2010. This corpus-based study of the language of state socialism compares 
texts from 1952, 1969 and 1977.
18  John Wesley Young, Totalitarian Language: Orwell’s Newspeak and its Nazi and 
Communist Antecedents, Charlottesville, VA and London, 1991, pp. 168–86.
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Leaving aside the assumptions in the use of the terms ‘socialism’, ‘rightist’, 
‘progressive’, ‘conservative’, ‘propaganda’ and ‘honest working people’, the 
very concept of the ‘class struggle’ is predicated on the irrefutability of the 
correctness of the Marxist notion of dialectical materialism. ‘Questionably 
unquestionable statements’ take the dissimulation a stage further, and 
disregard logical reasoning altogether, as in the assertion naše přátelství 
a spojenectví se SSSR […] je hlavní záštitou samé existence českého a 
slovenského národa (our friendship and alliance with the USSR […] is the 
main guarantor of the very existence of the Czech and Slovak nation). 
‘Bandwagon language’ refers to the use of phrases which encourage the 
notion that alternative perspectives are perverse; for instance, všichni 
komunisté budou i nadále neochvějnými bojovníky za realizaci současné 
politiky strany (all Communists will continue to be staunch advocates of the 
implementation of the current Party policy). ‘Aesopian language’ involves 
the use of phraseology which has alternative meanings to Communists and 
non-Communists, as in normalizační proces (normalization process) — an 
expression that signified the negation of ‘normality’ to many ordinary 
Czechs.
 This article adopts a corpus-driven discourse analysis approach, 
but it is also informed by selected aspects of critical discourse analysis 
and pragmatic theory, where they cast further light on the content and 
context.19 For the purpose of compiling statistical information, I employed 
an online version of Poučení (‘including errors’, to cite Pavel Rybka, who 
uploaded it), which I ‘cleaned’ manually in order to improve its accuracy 
and maximize consistency with the first bound edition (referred to in 
note 1).20 On the basis of the edited text, I used the Microsoft Word 
navigation facility Find to identify and produce my own lexicon of all the 
non-function words in the document. With reference to this list, I then 
compiled a smaller keyword list of lemmas and word families (comprising 
headwords, inflections, cognates and synonymous or semantically related 
derivatives and compound forms, and their negatives) with an occurrence 
19  For an accessible introduction to the approach, see, for example, Paul Baker, Using 
Corpora in Discourse Analysis, London and New York, 2006, and Norman Fairclough, 
Analysing Discourse, London and New York, 2005. The distinction between ‘corpus-
based’ and ‘corpus-driven’ investigations is highlighted by Elena Tognini-Bonelli, Corpus 
Linguistics at Work, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, 2001, chs 4 and 5. A corpus 
of 16,000 words is at the lower end of a specialized corpus, hence the desirability of 
employing supplementary analytical methods.
20  Poučení z krizového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSČ, Prague, 1988. 
Available at <http://web.quick.cz/pr/history/pouceni.htm> [accessed 11 February 2012]. 
‘Cleaning’ here relates mainly to correcting typographical errors and disambiguating 
meaning in the case of polysemous words. 
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of four or more.21 Cognates and related words, such as chyba (mistake) and 
chybný (incorrect), were thus treated as a single entity, as were the word 
families socialismus (socialism), socialistický (socialist), protisocialistický/
antisocialistický (anti-socialist); and důsledný (consistent), důsledně 
(consistently), nedůsledný (inconsistent) and nedůslednost (inconsistency). 
While this semi-manual process was time-consuming and fiddly, it 
obviated the need for parsing the input text or part-of-speech tagging 
and facilitated the task of identifying anomalies and inaccuracies in 
the online version of Poučení. The non-mechanistic approach likewise 
allowed for the clear identification of recurring themes, as discussed 
later. The document was subsequently analysed using the downloadable 
concordance programme Ant Conc, which facilitated, in particular, the 
process of identifying keywords in context and collocations.22 
The relevance of Poučení
Why is it important to revisit the language of Poučení now? There are at 
least six major reasons to look again at how the text is written:
1.  from the perspective of synchronic linguistics, it offers a valuable 
insight into language variation and change at a particular time and 
under a specific form of authoritarian rule;
2.  in diachronic terms, it makes a direct connection with the linguistic 
practices of the pre-reform era, and defines the parameters of post-
1968 political discourse;
3.  stylistically, it encapsulates the approved tone and general tenor of the 
debate in the normalization period — ritualistic, excessively emotive 
and clichéd, and devoid of the subtlety, nuance, humour and other 
scholarly and literary qualities which had characterized much of the 
better writing of the 1960s;23 
4.  conceptually, it represents the victory of strictly regulated one-sided 
Soviet speak over the exploration of ideas, exchange of information 
21  A keyword is a word that appears more than would be expected by chance alone, as 
determined by the comparison of its frequency in a specialized corpus with its frequency 
in a large reference corpus. Lists of keywords thus generally exclude function words.
22  Laurence Anthony, AntConc 3.2.4w, 2012. Available at <http://www.antlab.sci.
waseda.ac.jp/software.html> [accessed 12 March 2013].
23  Its style is reminiscent of Soviet Socialist Realism. As Katerina Clark, The Soviet 
Novel: History As Ritual, Bloomington, IN, 2000, p. 39, has pointed out, ‘What sets the 
Soviet novel apart from most other serious novels is the absence in it of those features that 
can be seen as exploration or celebration of the objective/subjective split: parody, irony, 
literary self-consciousness, and creative or complex use of point of view’. 
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and elaboration of alternative ideological perspectives which had 
flourished during the Prague Spring; 
5.  semantically, it introduces two of the principal leitmotifs of 
normalization (discussed later): sociální jistoty (social securities) and 
klid a pořádek (peace and order); 
6.  as a discourse theme in its own right, post-1968 Communism (and 
its symbols and language) has become topical, as reflected in the 
significant increase in populist and specialist studies over the last few 
years.24
 Why is it also important to bear in mind the historical setting in which 
the document was written? A corpus-driven approach only offers semi-
decontextualized information about a publication, and cannot always give 
an accurate indication of the motivations of its author(s), or its effect on 
its readership and its unforeseen consequences. The meaning of an overtly 
political speech act is especially context-dependent. In the case of Poučení, 
the perlocutionary effect of the discourse was derived entirely from the 
enforced changes in Czechoslovak society, and from the seminal status 
that the text was accorded by the Communist authorities, as reflected 
in the medium in which it first appeared. It is not possible to interpret 
its ‘meaning’ without a knowledge of the developments which preceded, 
accompanied and followed its publication. 
 The consequences of the Warsaw Pact intervention and the policy 
of normalization, enshrined in Poučení, can be categorized under three 
headings: intended and explicit; intended, but implicit; unintended and 
largely negative (accepting that the dogmatists were not uniformly 
motivated by self-interest, and were not all cynically striving for discord 
and stagnation).25 There are two interdependent intended and explicit 
messages which stand out:
1.  politically, it unambiguously reaffirmed the end of the creation of 
a civil society based on democratic socialism, popularly referred 
24  Mainstream publications include Oldřich Dudek, Hořký smích totality aneb Čítanka 
pro Husákovy děti, Prague, 2009, Adam Drda and Karel Strachota (eds), Naše normalizace, 
Prague, 2011, and Petr A. Bílek and Vladimír Pistorius, Tesilová kavalérie: Popkulturní 
obrazy normalizace, Příbram, 2010. Amongst the language publications which include 
detailed reference to normalization are Jiří Pruša, Abeceda reálného socialismu, Prague, 
2011, and Věra Schmiedtová, Malý slovník reálií komunistické totality, Prague, 2012.
25  From the Party’s perspective, the passivity and apathy which accompanied the 
changes also had positive effects, including the prevention of the emergence of a strong 
coordinated opposition.
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to as socialismus s  lidskou tváří (socialism with a human face), and 
endorsed a new direction, more akin to the values of the pre-1963 
post-Stalinist past;
2.  in terms of Soviet foreign policy, it was the clearest articulation of the 
limitations of self-determination in the Communist bloc, and of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine in practice.26 
 Amongst the implicit, but nonetheless intended messages, were:
1.  symbolically, it served as a (seemingly) lasting testament to Soviet-
imposed values — despite its manifest flaws, it not only remained 
largely unaltered for nearly twenty years, but its validity was dutifully 
and repeatedly asserted by politicians, teachers, historians, journalists 
and others in positions of authority and influence;27
2.  within the Central Committee of the KSČ, it confirmed the ascendancy 
of hardliners, led by Vasil Biľak, over pragmatists such as Lubomír 
Štrougal (Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1970 to 1988) and, 
to some extent perhaps, even Gustáv Husák (General Secretary of the 
Party from 1969 to 1987 and President of Czechoslovakia from 1975 to 
1989);28
3.  as an historical record of Party doctrine, it legitimized the claim, 
first made in the ‘organ’ of the Soviet Communist Party, Pravda, 
on 22 August 1968, that five senior ultra-leftist Party members, 
including Biľak, had signed a letter to Leonid Brezhnev, inviting the 
Soviet Union to intervene militarily. The original undated ‘letter of 
invitation’, which was written in Russian, requested ‘effective support 
and help by all means at your disposal’, while the Czech version 
added a more emotive appeal for ‘fraternal assistance’.29 A later letter 
26  See S. Kovalev, ‘Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries’, 
in Robin Alison Remington (ed.), Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak 
Communism in Crisis, Cambridge, MA and London, 1969, pp. 413–16, originally published 
in Pravda, 26 September 1968.
27  See, for example, Stále platné poučení: sborník materiálů z Celostátní vědecko-
praktické konference k 15. výročí Poučení z krizového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po 13. 
sjezdu KSČ, konané v Praze 9.–10. 12. 1985, Prague, 1986.
28  In his memoirs, Paměti Vasila Biľaka, vol. 2, p. 197, Biľak acknowledges ‘the hard 
struggle’ to get the document published, and the reluctance of those both within and 
outside the Central Committee of the KSČ ‘to tell the truth about the reasons for the 
Czechoslovak crisis and the intentions of the anti-socialist forces’.
29  For an authoritative account of the ‘story’ of the invitation letter, including a 
facsimile of the approved Russian version of the letter, see František Janáček and Marie 
Michálková, ‘Příběh zvacího dopisu’, Soudobé dějiny 1, 1993, pp. 87–101. H. Gordon 
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appealing for international assistance, signed by forty members of the 
Biľak faction, was hushed up with the support of the Kremlin, for fear 
of inciting further intra-Party dissension.30
 Ironically, the publication of Poučení also had several interconnected 
unintended negative consequences, including the following:
1.  ideologically, in conjunction with the official pronouncements and 
actions that it canonized, it divided society and shattered the post-
war ‘progressive’ consensus in Czechoslovakia, which the Communist 
Party never succeeded in rebuilding;31 
2.  psychologically, the military occupation and the policies that Poučení 
promoted had a profoundly depressive effect on the thinking and 
mood of many non-Party and Party members for nearly twenty 
years;32
3.  economically, the victory of dogmatism was damaging, not least 
because the process of normalization cleansing (normalizační očista) 
resulted in the dimissal and/or emigration of so many highly qualified 
people, and in the promotion of less talented successors;33
4.  in the eyes of most ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, the positive image 
of the Soviet military as a liberating force, which had been exploited 
endlessly by Communist propaganda, changed irreversibly to that of 
an occupying army; 
Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, Princeton, NJ, 1976, pp. 716–18, argues 
that the resurrection in Poučení of the reference to the appeal for ‘fraternal assistance’ was 
surprising. Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV, p. 68, on the other hand, has interpreted it 
as ‘an officially sanctioned provocation of sorts’, which deliberately exacerbated tensions 
between Biľak and Husák. Biľak himself consistently denied handing over the letter, even 
though he strongly endorsed the invitation thesis. 
30  See Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 103–04.
31  The notion of a ‘progressive’ consensus needs to be qualified. There had never 
been full agreement on how to achieve the broad equality and basic human rights which 
constituted this consensus. In practice, under normalization, most people occupied 
what has been termed the ‘gray zone’ (šedá zóna) between apathy (promoted by socialist 
consumerism) and opposition; see Jiřina Šiklová, ‘The ‘Gray Zone’ and the Future of 
Dissent in Czechoslovakia’, Social Research 57, 1990, 2, pp. 347–65.
32  According to an opinion poll cited in Hejzlar, Praha ve stínu, p. 149, in September 
1968 fewer than 10% of Party members approved of the intervention.
33  For a detailed overview of the purges, see Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 
1945, pp. 98–101. Renner, p. 101, puts the number of people dismissed, including ‘voluntary’ 
émigrés, at between 250,000 and 300,000. Even those who kept their jobs often felt 
compromised by the requirement to justify their views and behaviour during the events of 
1968 and 1969.
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5.  in terms of intra-Party politics, the short-term impact of the Warsaw 
Pact intervention was also very harmful — it divided the KSČ into 
different groups: the so-called ‘healthy core’, which comprised 235,270 
members who formed the screening commissions (prověrkové komise); 
the ‘misguided’ (pomýlení), who may have expressed sympathy for 
‘democratic socialism’, but were permitted to redeem themselves by 
renouncing the reforms and declaring support for the intervention; 
those who were ‘crossed off ’ the Party lists (vyškrtnutí), either because 
they remained silent or chose not to renew their Party membership, 
and committed reform Communists, who were expelled from the 
Party (vyloučení ze strany);34 
6.  in the longer term, it contributed to complacency, cynicism and 
opportunism within the Party ranks, which further alienated ordinary 
citizens; 
7.  as a corollary of the above, it rendered political change more 
problematic when Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost´ and 
perestroika briefly opened up the possibility of socialist reform in the 
late 1980s;35
8. outside Czechoslovakia, the suppression of the reform movement 
severely harmed the reputation of the Soviet system (already tarnished 
by the excesses of Stalinism and the invasion of Hungary in 1956); 
9. within the international socialist movement, attitudes to Marxism-
Leninism consequently became more critical, and Western Communist 
Parties were weakened or split into different factions;
10. as a further result of the entrenchment of the orthodox faction, in 
the Czech lands, the successor Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSČM) has remained a largely ‘conservative’ organization, 
which is reluctant to dissociate itself entirely from its past;36 
34  Membership of the KSČ had declined by over a quarter to 1,217,246 by the end of 
1970 as a result of expulsions, suspensions and resignations. See Renner and Kamil Činátl, 
Téma: Poučení z krizového vývoje, Prague, 2008. Available at <http://www.ustrcr.cz/data/
pdf/projekty/antologie/tema5.pdf> [accessed 9 March 2012]. 
35  See Michal Pullmann, Konec experimentu. Přestavba a pád komunismu 
v Československu, Prague, 2011. Ironically, as Gorbachev himself admits in Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague 
Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism, translated by George Shriver, New York, 2003, p. 47, 
the Prague Spring was a major impulse in the development of his critical thinking.
36  By contrast with the situation in the Czech lands, the core membership of the 
Communist Party of Slovakia established the more moderate Party of the Democratic 
Left (SDĽ), which later merged with a breakaway faction, Direction–Social Democracy 
(Smer–SD).
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11. the continued presence of the Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSČM) as an electoral force has made it difficult for the 
other principal left-of-centre party, the Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD), to reach successful coalition agreements;37 
12. in generational terms, Poučení may have helped to enforce a fissure 
between the students of 1989 and reform Communists of the Prague 
Spring (the so-called muži ledna [‘the men of January’]) and their 
supporters, who were sometimes criticized by the former for having 
capitulated to hardliners;38
13. as a consequence of the widespread disillusionment with the approved 
norms of post-1968 society, many Czech intellectuals have now 
adopted right-of-centre views, which run counter to the Czechoslovak 
egalitarian ethos, as discussed by Holý, amongst others.39 
The structure of Poučení
The text begins with a short preamble, which refers to the preparations 
by the Central Committee and loyal Party activists, from April 1969, 
to explain the reasons for the ‘crisis’ which culminated in the ‘counter-
revolution’ of 1968. From the outset, the document thus assumes (but 
does not substantiate) the unquestionability of the premise on which the 
Marxist-Leninist line is based; namely, that the Prague Spring was a time 
of unwelcome upheaval which threatened the very existence of socialism. 
Moreover, it immediately impresses on its readership what Petr Fidelius has 
termed the ‘implicit principle of Party infallibility’, which was a sine qua 
non of the leading role of the Party.40 (The dogmatists’ narrow conception 
of socialism failed to take into account that most Czechs had claimed to be 
strongly committed to the socialist cause, even if they did not necessarily 
endorse the monolithic Soviet model.)41 The second paragraph reveals that 
37  The Communists polled over 20% in the 2012 regional elections.
38  ‘The men of January’ relates to Dubček’s reformist faction, which came to power in 
January 1968. Galia Golan, ‘Youth and Politics in Czechoslovakia’, Journal of Contemporary 
History 5, 1970, 1, pp. 3–22 (p. 4), identifies a parallel gulf between young people in the 
sixties and their parents’ generation, whom they blamed for the Munich capitulation. 
39  See Ladislav Holy, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation, Cambridge, 
1996, and Václav Hořejší, Proč jsou (mladí) intelektuálové většinou příznivci „pravice“?, 
20 February 2010. Available at <http://blog.aktualne.centrum.cz/blogy/vaclav-horejsi.
php?itemid=9008> [accessed 2 May 2013].
40  Petr Fidelius, Řeč komunistické moci, Prague, 1998, p. 169.
41  According to Emanuel Pecka, ‘Political Culture in the Czech Republic’, in Fritz 
Plasser and Andreas Pribersky (eds), Political Culture in East Central Europe, Aldershot, 
1996, pp. 205–10 (p. 206), 86% of Czechs in surveys conducted by the Institute of Public 
Opinion in June and July 1968 wished to retain socialism.
THE LANGUAGE OF CZECH NORMALIZATION 225
the change to Party membership cards, accompanied by interviews with 
over one and a half million members, helped ‘to expose further the activities 
of rightist and anti-socialist forces in the Party’. There is no attempt to put 
alternative perspectives, or to seek compromise with more progressive-
minded Communists. In the terms of critical discourse analysis (or more 
precisely a discourse-historical approach), the text exhibits the triumph of 
a dominant minority ideology, reinforced by the might of the state, over a 
disempowered majority, with virtually no means to challenge the imposed 
norms. 
 The main body of the document is divided into three rather ill-defined 
sections of roughly 3,000, 4,000 and 9,000 words, respectively. In as much 
as they can be said to have unifying themes, the first section seeks to 
contextualize the triumph of the KSČ, the mistakes of the Party leadership 
(especially those of Antonín Novotný, General Secretary of the KSČ from 
September 1953 to January 1968 and President of Czechoslovakia from 
November 1957 to March 1968), and the results of the 1968 January Plenum 
of the KSČ. Section Two focuses on the equivocation of the Party leadership 
after January 1968, on the strengthening position of ‘right-wing’ forces 
within the KSČ and organizations with ‘anti-socialist’ tendencies, on the 
rejection of political reform (especially the Action Programme, published 
on 5 April 1968, Ludvík Vaculík’s ‘Two Thousand Words’, published on 
27 June 1968, and the re-emergence of the Social Democratic Party as 
an independent body), and on the failure of Dubček (First Secretary of 
the KSČ, from 5 January 1968 to 17 April 1969) and his closest allies to 
implement the political solutions to the ‘crisis’ discussed with ‘fraternal 
socialist countries’. The third section discusses at length the role played 
by ‘opportunistic’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’ elements in Czechoslovak 
society. It outlines six developments attributable to rightist factions: 1) the 
decline of the KSČ as the managing centre (řídící centrum) of the socialist 
system; 2) the disintegration of the power organs (mocenské orgány) of 
the socialist state; 3) the emasculation of the National Front, especially 
the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH), and the creation of 
‘openly anti-socialist’ organizations, such as The Club of Former Political 
Prisoners (K 231) and The Club of the Non-Party Activists (KAN); 4) the 
potential erosion of the leading role of the Party in economic matters 
(resulting from the reforms proposed by Ota Šik); 5) ideological deviation 
from Marxism-Leninism, attributable to the pressure put on ‘honest 
editors and journalists’ by ‘aggressive groups of so-called progressives’, 
and 6) challenges to the pro-Soviet orientation of the state, which divided 
society, and thus threatened civil war. 
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 It is to be assumed that the symbolically significant five-pointed star 
on page 32 denotes the end of the sixth development listed, but it is not 
clear why the document fails to add a new (fourth) section, given that the 
subsequent text is neither a continuation nor a summary of section three. 
Whatever the reason, pages 32–43, which conclude with another star, offer 
an amorphous and subjective account of the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact 
intervention and the reimposition of Marxism-Leninism. Poučení ends 
with a short and poignant reaffirmation of the triumph of orthodoxy under 
the leadership of the KSČ, which offers no scope for further discussion or 
alternative points of view. It is not so much the emphatic nature of the 
expression of doctrine which spells out the stark reality of the new order, 
but the broader socio-political context in which it is set. The document as 
a whole derives much of its perlocutionary force from people’s real-world 
knowledge, which is reinforced by a combination of intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity. In other words, the reader relates the vocabulary used, 
both synchronically and diachronically, to their own experiences, and to 
similarly authoritarian discourse in the public domain at the same time 
and in the pre-reform era.42
Principal themes and word groups 
Like much of the political propaganda published before and after the 
Prague Spring, the sophistry of Poučení depends for its impact partly 
on the repetition of a series of well-worn themes and recurring semi-
preconstructed phrases, as defined in Sinclair’s ‘idiom principle’.43 The 
use of shibboleths and empty expressions (or floskule in Czech) is both 
literally and metaphorically part of the ‘normalization process’, in that 
it reinforces the semantic, stylistic and conceptual parameters of the 
post-1968 discourse. The stereotypically bureaucratic and ideologically 
ritualistic language of Poučení — a prime example of what Françoise 
Thom has called ‘la langue de bois’ (wooden language)44 — seeks not to 
enlighten or to stimulate discussion, but to obfuscate and stifle debate. The 
42  See Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, Majid KhosraviNik, Michał Krzyżanowski, 
Tony McEnery and Ruth Wodak, ‘A Useful Methodological Synergy? Combining Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to Examine Discourses of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in the UK Press’, Discourse & Society, 19, 2008, 3, pp. 273–306 (pp. 279–80 
and 299), and Ruth Wodak, ‘Introduction’, in Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski 
(eds), Qualitative Discourse Analysis for the Social Sciences, Basingstoke, 2008.
43  J. M. Sinclair (ed.), Looking up: An Account of the Cobuild Project in Lexical 
Computing, London, 1993, p. 110.
44  Françoise Thom, Newspeak: The Language of Soviet Communism (La Langue de 
Bois), London, 1989, translated by Ken Connelly.
THE LANGUAGE OF CZECH NORMALIZATION 227
opaqueness of the vocabulary employed is such that the school edition of 
the text (see note 8) chose to include a five-page terminological glossary 
comprising definitions of 144 head words and phrases.45 
 In order to classify lexical collocations, I looked for recurring thematic 
patterns in Poučení with a minimum of ten occurrences. This ruled out 
several striking, but statistically insignificant word clusters, and ensured 
representativeness. The lexical collocations identified can be grouped 
under at least fifteen broadly defined (and sometimes overlapping) themes, 
each of which forms part of the canon of unreformed Communist speak: 
1) manifestations of opposition or threats to socialism (in its orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist conception); 2) the enemies of progress; 3) the First 
Republic (1918–38) and the ‘abuse’ of human rights; 4) Munich 1938, the 
wartime struggle for self-determination and liberation by the Soviet Army; 
5) the establishment of socialism and revolutionary change; 6) the concrete 
achievements of socialism; 7) the notion of ‘crisis’ and the problems faced 
by the Party; 8) the role of the ‘people’ (lid); 9) the ideological battle; 10) 
Marxism-Leninism; 11) the defenders of the ‘healthy’ tendencies, and the 
role and interests of the Party; 12) missed opportunities; 13) the role of the 
USSR and Czechoslovakia’s links with the Soviet Union (and her allies); 
14) opposition to the Warsaw Pact intervention; and 15) normalization, 
re-evaluation of the past and socialist renewal. There are three further 
metalinguistic lexical groupings, which constitute a specific kind of stylistic 
and/or semantic sub-category: 1) phrases in double inverted commas, such 
as „nová“ politika strany (the ‘new’ politics of the Party);46 2) expressions 
preceded by takzvaný/tzv. (so-called), such as takzvaný československý 
experiment (the so-called Czechoslovak experiment) and tzv. sjezd českých 
komunistů (the so-called congress of Czech Communists); and 3) text 
highlighted in bold, as if to elevate it to the status of a locus classicus; 
for instance, nejsilnějším poutem je socialistický internacionalismus (the 
strongest bond is socialist internationalism).
 Manifestations of opposition or threats to Soviet-style hegemony 
include the usual leitmotifs and isms of Marxist-Leninist dogma: counter-
revolution, opportunism, revisionism, anti-socialist platforms, imperialism, 
ideological diversion, capitalist aggression, international reaction, right-
wing attacks, and so forth. Young has applied the term ‘elastic words’ to 
45  The word list also allowed the ideologues to impose their own interpretation 
of meaning. For example, levicové síly (left-wing forces) is defined as ‘in politics: a 
designation for an advocate of progressive, revolutionary views; in the socialist movement: 
advocates of Marxist-Leninist views (the antithesis of right-wing revisionists)’, p. 90.
46  Where appropriate, text is put into the nominative case, and capitals and full stops 
are removed.
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these stereotypical catch-all phrases embracing ‘disparate categories of 
people, ideas, and experience’.47 Statistically, the most important are pravice 
(the right), pravicový (right-wing [adj.]), pravicově (right-wing [adv.]), 
pravičák (right-winger), with 182 citations (ranked third in the corpus of 
lexical words); kontrarevoluce (counter-revolution) and its derivatives, 
kontrarevoluční (counter-revolutionary) and kontrarevolucionář (counter-
revolutionary), with 59 citations; oportunismus (opportunism) and its 
derivatives oportunista (opportunist) and oportunistický (opportunistic), 
with 47 citations; the adjectives protisocialistický and antisocialistický 
(antisocialist), cited 42 times; and revize (revision), revizionismus 
(revisionism), revizionistický (revisionist [adj.]) and revidovat (to revise), 
with 39 citations. There are no objective criteria by which to establish the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a particular lexeme or word group in a 
specialized document of this nature. Frequency of usage, however, gives 
at least some indication of the relative importance of cognate forms in 
the hierarchy of Communist rhetoric.48 In most cases, lexical words and 
derivatives which occur in the top one hundred in Poučení (that is, with 
22 or more citations) considerably exceed their frequency in the standard 
non-political lexicon. Other less commonly occurring forms may, of 
course, also exceed expectations, as with usnesení (resolution), cited eleven 
times (or 0.06% of all citations) and aparát (apparatus), cited eight times 
(or 0.05%), compared with 1,622 citations (or 0.0016%) and 2,398 citations 
(or 0.0024%), respectively, in the 100-million-word sub-corpus of the Czech 
National Corpus, SYN 2010, based mainly on texts from 2005 to 2009.49
 The constant repetition and semantic flexibility of the descriptor 
‘right’ is especially conspicuous, and is intended to reinforce a negative 
association between any kind of deviation from Marxism-Leninism and 
‘bourgeois’ politics. Equally noteworthy is the overuse of negative prefixes, 
such as kontra-, proti- and anti-, with a pejoratively tinged noun or 
adjective elsewhere in  the phrase.50 This favoured rhetorical device serves 
simultaneously to invalidate and equate all expressions of reform, thereby 
implicitly reinforcing the correctness and unassailability of Party doctrine. 
Another disparaging concept which stands out is ‘revisionism’. Michael 
47  See Young, Totalitarian Language, pp. 178–80.
48  The problem of interpreting the significance of the data is compounded by the fact 
that the other available corpora deal in raw frequencies for headwords (rather than lexical 
word groups). 
49  Korpus SYN 2010, Český národní korpus, Prague <http://ucnk.ff.cuni.cz> [accessed 
17 July 2013].
50  See Young, Totalitarian Language, pp. 176–78.
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Waller has argued that this is ‘the most sensitive term of the whole of the 
vocabulary of the communist movement’. Of the two meanings of the 
noun identified by Waller — the re-examination of Marxist theory in the 
light of changing circumstances, and the condemnation of particular Party 
policies — it is in the latter (more common) sense that it was employed in 
Poučení. However, the document does not observe a systematic distinction 
between revisionists who, Waller argues, are traditionally regarded as 
deviant members of the Communist movement, and reformists, who lie 
outside the movement.51 Indeed, the concept of reforma (reform), which 
was adopted by Dubček and his allies, appears only three times in any form 
in the text; in each case in relation to economic change. 
 Highly significant in the context of the hardliners’ ideological battle is 
the prominence of phrases alluding explicitly to the challenge to socialism 
from within; including the enduring influence of bourgeois democracy, the 
re-emergence of nationalism (cf. echoes of the show trials of the early 1950s), 
and the breakdown of the established order within the Party, the state 
apparatus, the judiciary, the security forces and society as a whole. The noun 
buržoazie (bourgeoisie), and its derivatives buržoazní (bourgeois [adj.]) 
and buržoazně (demokratický) (bourgeois [adv.] [democratic]), as well as 
maloburžoazní and its synonym maloměšťácký (petit-bourgeois [adj.]), are 
cited 30 times, in phrases such as zbytky buržoazních názorů (the remnants 
of bourgeois views) and maloburžoazní ideologie nacionalismu (the petit-
bourgeois ideology of nationalism). Other manifestations of internal 
dissent are expressed in nominalizations such as rozněcování nenávisti 
proti Sovětskému svazu (the inflaming of hatred against the Soviet Union) 
and abstract noun phrases such as masarykismus a sociáldemokratismus 
(Masarykism and social democratism), which harks back to Novotný’s 
kampaň proti sociáldemokratismu a masarykismu (campaign against social 
democratism and Masarykism) in December 1953.52
 Much has been made of the function of nominalization as a transitivity 
feature in ideological discourse. Simpson and Mayr, for example, have 
argued that ‘Nominalization offers a less specific representation of an 
action, largely because it “stands for” a process while simultaneously 
eliding those in the process’.53 Alan Partington has described it as an 
‘information-impoverishment technique’, and has noted that ‘it removes 
51  Michael Waller, The Language of Communism: A Commentary, London, Sydney and 
Toronto, 1972, pp. 66 and 68.
52  Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk was President of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1935.
53  Paul Simpson and Andrea Mayr, Language and Power: A Resource Book for Students, 
London, New York, 2010, p. 6.
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the indications of time and modality that are generally present in a verb 
clause’.54 Put simply, it serves to limit the scope of the investigation by 
avoiding specific reference to the actors, temporal details and various other 
‘conditions’ which surround the discourse theme. Particularly striking 
is the absence of epistemic modal expressions (relating to the likelihood 
of the veracity of the official interpretation of events).55 The authors of 
Poučení clearly understood that any formulations that invited equivocation 
or questioning would erode their authority. 
 Another method employed extensively in Poučení, which obviates 
the need to be explicit, is the use of the passive voice. Once again this 
periphrastic technique avoids direct reference to agency, thereby rendering 
the text less susceptible to purely factual criticism. Kamil Činátl suggests 
that passive constructions, such as je řečeno (it is said), uskutečňovala se 
(came into force) and byly obsaženy (were contained), add to the appearance 
of objectivity. He also asserts that, in the absence of a specified agent, the 
position of the subject is mainly occupied by abstract entities. This is borne 
out by examples such as proces rozvíjení socialistické revoluce […] (the 
process of the development of the socialist revolution […]) and antisovětská 
orientace pravicových sil v KSČ […] (the anti-Soviet orientation of right-
wing forces in the KSČ […]), although the twelve nouns that he cites are 
not confined to the role of subject. He further observes that active verbal 
forms are primarily linked to the aggressive behaviour of the right, and 
gives several good illustrations, such as začala uvádět v pochybnost (began 
to cast into doubt), narušovala (eroded), přecházela do útoku (moved onto 
the offensive).56 As elsewhere, the intention is to create the impression of a 
series of inalienable and immutable ‘truths’, which cannot be challenged, 
and are independent of the judgements and feelings of the authors. 
 The rhetoric of Poučení has the effect of creating a kind of quasi-
reality, which deflects attention from the true nature of one-party rule. 
This involves, inter alia, the evocation of a semi-mythical past, which 
presents all challenges to the status quo as inimical to the interests of 
socialist progress. Particularly noteworthy are expressions relating to 
the foundation of the one-party state, such as kontrarevoluční puč v 
únoru 1948 (the counter-revolutionary putsch in 1948), which has specific 
associations with the ‘Trial of anti-state conspiracy centred around Rudolf 
54  Alan Partington, The Linguistics of Political Argument: The Spin-doctor and the Wolf-
pack at the White House, London and New York, 2003, p. 15.
55  For more on the semantic domain of epistemic modality, see, for example, Jan Nuyts, 
Epistemic Modality, Language, and Conceptualization: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Perspective, 
Amsterdam, 2001, pp. 21–32.
56  Činátl, Téma, p. 10.
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Slánský’ in 1951.57 The rewriting of the story of the Prague Spring in 
late 1970 was more problematic, because the events were still very much 
in people’s memory, and there was such widespread opposition to the 
Warsaw Pact intervention. This did not, however, discourage the authors 
of the text from depicting a situation in which there was a major threat of 
violent conflict, as suggested by the expressions krvavá tragédie (bloody 
tragedy), občanská válka (civil war), ovzduší hysterie zastrašování a teroru 
(atmosphere of the hysteria of intimidation and terror) and rodící se 
bílý teror (growing white terror). Ironically, the only sustained violence 
in 1968 accompanied the arrival of foreign troops, and was justified by 
the euphemism bratrská internacionální pomoc (fraternal international 
assistance). Few of those who had lived through the period would have 
recognized the plot constructed by the hardliners (in either its literary or 
its political sense) but, over time, in conjunction with other propaganda, 
and in the absence of alternative sources of information, the text may have 
had some success in promoting the notion that the changes threatened 
stability.58 More importantly, perhaps, it offered reform-minded citizens, 
for whom pragmatism subsequently took precedence over principle, a 
pretext for justifying their volte-face. 
 One of the salient features of the language of Communism, as exemplified 
by Poučení, was that it established a series of axiological contrasts: between 
positive (pozitivní) and negative (negativní), right (správný) and wrong 
(nesprávný), consistent (důsledný) and inconsistent (nedůsledný), resolute 
(rozhodný, pevný [firm]) and irresolute (nerozhodný, kolísavý [wavering]), 
unity (jednota) and division (nejednota), the truth (pravda) and lies (lži), and 
others. This binary division implicitly contributed to a broader Manichean 
opposition between ‘good’ (the Party and its policies) and ‘bad’ (alternatives 
to Marxism-Leninism), as manifest most clearly in the contrast between 
the ‘healthy core’ and the seemingly innumerable enemies of progress. 
The foes were both internal, as in phrases such as opoziční, tzv. druhé 
centrum ve straně (the oppositional so-called second centre in the Party) 
and reakční představitelé katolického kléru (reactionary representatives of 
the Catholic clergy), and external, as in agenti západních rozvědek (agents 
of Western espionage groups) and revizionistický a pravicově mezinárodní 
57  While there was inevitably some concerted opposition to the establishment of state 
socialism in February 1948, the notion of a counter-revolutionary putsch (spearheaded by 
Slánský, whose name was cleared in April 1963, and who was fully rehabilitated in May 
1968) is a misrepresentation of historical fact. 
58  My own experience of talking to younger Czechs in the 1980s was that they were 
poorly informed about the events of 1968, and were sceptical about the reform movement.
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imperialismus (revisionist and right-orientated international imperialism). 
As in other cases, some of the blame is explicitly pinned on the failure of 
the system to eradicate the influence of Czechoslovakia’s pre-socialist past: 
náboženské přežitky (religious remnants), představitelé poražené buržoazie 
(representatives of the defeated bourgeoisie), and so on. 
 Harry Hodgkinson has identified three distinct types of terms of abuse 
for the enemies of socialism: 1) epithets based on the notion of capitalist 
exploitation, such as ‘capitalist hyenas’, 2) verbal caricatures intended to 
raise prejudice against opponents, such as ‘chewing-gum spivs’, and 3) 
words used within the Communist movement against backsliders, such 
as ‘opportunist’.59 Poučení did not resort to the first two (largely outdated) 
forms of slur, but it abounded in disparaging fixed expressions for those 
who deviated from Marxism-Leninism, such as pravicově oportunistické 
sily (right-orientated opportunistic forces). This crude denigration of 
the opposition, real or invented, was intended both to undermine their 
legitimacy and to highlight the uncompromising stance of the new ruling 
elite. However, it also served a more subtle propagandistic purpose — 
to encourage those who had been in favour of Dubček’s reforms, but 
were apprehensive about the speed and scale of the changes, to distance 
themselves from more radical ‘elements’.
 Unlike János Kádár (General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party from 1956 to 1988), who replaced the dictum ‘whoever is not 
for us is against us’ (in Czech kdo není s námi, je proti nám) with the (New 
Testament) formulation ‘whoever is not against us is for us’ (kdo není proti 
nám, je s námi), the neo-Stalinist faction in Czechoslovakia quickly rejected 
all forms of inclusivity which necessitated compromise. Biľak and his 
associates persisted with the view that there was one correct interpretation 
of Marxism-Leninism, and that any alternative perspectives represented a 
coordinated opposition to socialist values. The hardliners’ fixation with a 
common, unified enemy is reflected throughout Poučení in maxims such 
as blok revizionistických a nacionalistických sil (bloc of revisionist and 
nationalistic forces) and protikomunistická a protisovětská fronta (anti-
Communist and anti-Soviet front). Nowhere does the document draw 
the logical inference that the alleged nature and strength of the resistance 
posed by the ‘other’ might be a corollary of the very policies advocated by 
the erstwhile Party hierarchy.
 The juxtaposition of the supposed triumph of state socialism and 
the failings of the ‘bourgeois’ past is highlighted several times in the 
59  Harry Hodgkinson, Doubletalk: The Language of Communism, London, 1955, p. 2.
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text; compare, for example, phrases such as utiskovaná a vykořisťovaná 
dělnická třída (the oppressed and exploited working class) and odstranila 
se zaostalost, bída i vystěhovalectví (backwardness, poverty and emigration 
have been eliminated). ‘Bourgeois’ policies are also explicitly linked, 
as early as the fifth paragraph, to the German occupation: Mnichov 
a rozbití ČSR prokázaly, že vládnoucí česká a s ní spjatá slovenská 
buržoazie zaprodala pro své třídní vykořisťovatelské zájmy i samu existenci 
československého samostatného státu (Munich and the break-up of the 
Czechoslovak Republic [ČSR] demonstrated that the ruling Czech and 
associated Slovak bourgeoisie also betrayed, for the sake of their own class 
interests, the very existence of the independent Czechoslovak state). Later 
in the document, the authors twice employ předmnichovská republika 
(pre-Munich Republic) (which I have termed elsewhere a ‘temporal 
frame’) to reinforce the idea of a connection between liberal democracy 
and the occupation.60 The strength of the association between the noun 
Mnichov and the Munich Agreement, and the continued use of pejorative 
epithets such as mnichovský diktát (Munich Diktat) and mnichovská zrada 
(Munich Betrayal), testify to its iconic status in Czech historiography. The 
fact that the authors use virtually the same phrases to denote the Second 
(post-Munich) Czechoslovak Republic (30 September 1938 to 15 March 
1939) and the Prague Spring — kritická doba (critical time) and kritické 
období (critical period), respectively — would thus appear not to be 
coincidental. By contrast with the humiliation of Munich, the struggle for 
self-determination and the role of the Soviet Army in the liberation of the 
Slovak and Czech lands are repeatedly lauded in Poučení and other official 
sources to justify the Communists’ exclusive right to rule and their de facto 
subordination to Moscow.
 The establishment of socialism and revolutionary change is denoted in 
the text by several of the buzz phrases of Communism, including budování 
/ výstavba socialismu / socialistická výstavba (the construction of socialism 
/ socialist construction), cited seventeen times, and únor / Vítězný únor / 
únorové vítězství (February / Victorious February / the February Victory 
[1948]), cited thirteen times.61 The concrete achievements of the regime, 
as identified in the document, broadly relate to the themes of economic, 
cultural and social progress, and freedom from the threat of disturbance; 
for instance, úspěchy v politickém, hospodářském a kulturním životě našeho 
lidu (successes in the political, economic and cultural life of our people), 
60  Tom Dickins, ‘Historical “Signposts” and Other Temporal Indicators in the Czech 
Lexicon’, Slavonic and East European Review, 90, 2012, 4, pp. 601–41 (p. 622).
61  Note also poúnorová emigrace (post-February emigration), cited twice.
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byla vytvořena sociální jistota pro pracující lid (social security had been set 
up for working people) and nastolení klidu a pořádku (the establishment 
of peace and order). The themes of social security and the opportunity to 
carry out one’s work unimpeded, as later encapsulated in the phrase klid 
na práci (let us work in peace; literally ‘peace for work’), became central to 
the regime’s attempt to propagate the notion of stability and order based 
on popular consensus. Ripka comments on the increase in the use of both 
concepts, and cites the following figures for the collocation sociální jistota 
in SKT: 1952 — 0 occurrences, 1969 — 3, 1977 — 74.62 Judging from the 
accounts of oral history, the provision of basic social services remains 
the aspect of (post-1968) socialism that is most highly regarded by Czech 
workers to this day.63 
 Much of the content of Poučení inevitably focuses on the reasons for 
the ‘crisis’ of 1968 and the problems faced by the Party. The mistakes of 
the past are superficially acknowledged, but they are largely attributed 
to the influence of forces and phenomena antithetical to ultra-leftist 
orthodoxy. Many of the manifestations of deviationism are non-specific 
and formulaic, and are characterized by the use of ‘wooden’ language 
(especially nominalizations). Examples include narušování zásad 
demokratického centralismu a vnitrostranické demokracie (erosion of the 
principles of democratic centralism and intra-Party democracy), and 
zanedbávání třídního přístupu ke společenským problémům (disregard of 
the class approach to social problems). 
 Rarely is there any specific recognition of the worst excesses of 
socialism, except for an oblique reference to the Piller Commission (set 
up in April 1968 to examine the show trials), which is couched in terms 
of criticism of the right: [pravice] drze zneužila fakt, že strana přiznala a 
kritizovala případy porušení socialistické zákonnosti v padesátých letech 
([the right] arrogantly misused the fact that the Party had recognized and 
criticized cases of the violation of socialist legality in the fifties). As Fidelius 
has pointed out, the Party only ever alludes to its own mistakes when they 
are in the past — in the context of the present, the Party is always in the 
right.64 Other non-generalized criticism of the past in Poučení is largely 
confined to ‘safe’ targets, which had already been officially discredited, 
including Novotný, Dubček’s associates, the Action Programme, the media 
62  Vojtěch Ripka, ‘Životní jistoty jako nabídka normalizace’, in Jan Kalous and Jiří Kocian 
(eds), Český a slovenský komunismus (1921–2011), Prague, 2012, pp. 193–200 (pp. 197–99).
63  See, for example, Milan Otáhal, ‘Ze života dělníků za tzv. normalizace’, in Oldřich 
Tůma and Tomáš Vilímek (eds), Opozice a společnost po roce 1948, Prague, 2009, pp. 110–75.
64  Fidelius, Řeč komunistické moci, p. 137.
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and economic reform. Novotný, cited twelve times (once in the adjectival 
form novotnovský), was a useful sacrificial lamb, since his leadership had 
succeeded in uniting apparently irreconcilable factions in opposition to 
him. The authors may make a valid point when they state naprostá většina 
strany a společnosti zásadně odmítala návrat k metodám A. Novotného (an 
absolute majority of the Party and society fundamentally rejected a return 
to the methods of A. Novotný), but they fail to note that many of those 
opposed to him were striving for more radical reform. 
 Dubček, cited 33 times, was more problematic because of his popularity; 
hence, the disapproval tends to be more measured, and focuses more on 
his lack of leadership skills than his policies: A. Dubček neměl předpoklady 
pro pochopení složitosti situace a rizik spojených se změnou vedení (A. 
Dubček did not have the qualifications necessary to understand the 
complexity of the situation and the risks involved in the change of 
leadership). The strongest criticism of Dubček is for his support of the 
declaration of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the night of 20 
August 1968 (which made it clear that Warsaw Pact troops had crossed 
the border without his knowledge). This is described, in an exemplar of 
Aesopian language, as netřídní, protiinternacionalistické prohlášení (a non-
class, anti-internationalist declaration). The term protiinternacionalistický, 
applied to a declaration which reflected widepread international dismay 
about intervention, highlights the semantic elasticity of Communist 
speak. As Waller has pointed out, the Soviet Union justified the apparent 
contravention of national sovereignty by distinguishing between ‘limited 
sovereignty’ and ‘supreme sovereignty’, with the latter equating to 
proletarian (socialist) internationalism.65
 Spokesmen for the pro-Soviet ‘healthy core’ of the Party were hamstrung 
by the fact that their vision of reality did not conform to public sentiment 
or to the accepted democratic and judicial norms of other (West European) 
countries. The logic of many of their assertions was contingent on a 
blind acceptance of the superimposed model; for instance, co bylo legální, 
prohlašovalo se za nelegální, zatímco veškerému ilegálnímu počínání 
kontrarevoluce se dávalo zdání legality (that which was legal was declared 
illegal, whilst all manner of illegal counter-revolutionary goings-on were 
given a semblance of legality). Elsewhere, the use of the reformists’ values 
had become so established in popular parlance that the hardliners had to 
employ their opponents’ terms of reference, qualified by ironic quotation 
65  Waller, The Language of Communism, p. 151.
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marks, as identified by Young, to establish their own position.66 A good 
illustration is the phrase střetnutí mezi těmi, kdož jsou pro leden, a těmi, 
kdo jsou proti němu, mezi „progresívními“ a „konzervativními“ komunisty 
(a clash between those who are for January and those who are against it, 
between ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ Communists).
 The Communists frequently drew on the spurious notion of the 
collective will of ‘the people’ (lid ) and ‘the masses’ (masy) to justify their 
policies. The term lid and its adjectival and adverbial forms lidový and 
lidově are cited 62 times in the text, and are distinguished in the corpus 
from the politically neutral terms lidé (people) and lidský (human), 
which occur fifteen times. The noun masy is found six times, while its 
semantically broader adjectival and adverbial forms, masový and masově 
(mass), have a combined total of seven citations. What exactly lid and masy 
meant was never accurately established. In the 1950s, lid broadly defined 
those members of the working class, especially manual labourers and 
farmworkers, but also the ‘stratum’ of the working intelligentsia (pracující 
inteligence), who could be identified with advancing the Communist cause. 
However, it subsequently came to refer to a wider spectrum of society and, 
in practice, to almost everyone who was not considered an opponent of 
the regime. In Poučení, it is used to evoke the implausible notion of the 
(sometimes barely visible and largely silent) majority, who supposedly 
shared the convictions of the hardline leadership, as in všechen pracující 
lid (all the working people).67 The descriptor masy similarly served as an 
all-embracing category, which differentiated the bulk of the population 
from those opposed to the regime, as in the tautology široké lidové masy 
(the broad popular masses).  
 All except the most naive of unreformed Communists must have 
known that the intensity of the ideological campaign being waged was 
incompatible with the level of support that they claimed for themselves. 
They must have also recognized that many of the figures of speech used 
in Poučení were reminiscent of those of the 1950s. For instance, the notion 
of the ideological ‘battle’ is reflected not merely in the more obvious 
military metaphors, such as revoluční boj dělnické třídy (the revolutionary 
fight of the working class), but also in phrases such as zápas za existenci 
našich národů (the struggle for the existence of our nations), bránit/uhájit 
věc socialismu (to defend the socialist cause), poctiví pracovníci […] byli 
66  Young, Totalitarian Language, pp. 174–76.
67  For a more detailed discussion of the concept of ‘the people’, see Waller, The 
Language of Communism, pp. 128–29.
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politicky odzbrojováni (decent people […] were politically disarmed), 
ofenzívní nástup (an offensive drive) and „kdo s koho“ (‘showdown’). There 
are 42 citations of boj and its derivatives, bojovník (fighter), (do-) bojovat 
(to fight) and bojeschopnost (fighting ability), and 22 citations of zápas. The 
noun boj is especially reminiscent of the early socialist era, as reflected in 
the figures in SKT: 1952 — 2029 ppm, 1969 — 863, 1977 — 1280.
 The self-proclaimed defenders of the ‘healthy’ tendencies repeatedly 
appealed to Marxism-Leninism as the sole scientifically based guarantor 
of human progress and unquestioningly extolled the leading role (vedoucí 
úloha) and leading organs (vedoucí orgány) of the Party, as legitimized 
by their ideological credo. The terms marxismus-leninismus (Marxism-
Leninism) and marxisticko-leninský (Marxism-Leninist) are cited 49 times 
in Poučení, while vedoucí úloha and vedoucí orgány appear fourteen times 
and six times, respectively. The authors of the text are at pains to establish a 
close connection between Marxism-Leninism and collective responsibility, 
as in the expression jednota strany a čistota jejího marxisticko-leninského 
učení (the unity of the Party and the purity of its Marxist-Leninist 
teachings). The notion of a common purpose is further exemplified by 
phrases such as ideová a akční jednota (unity of ideas and actions) and 
kolektivní poznání strany (the collective consciousness of the Party). 
Elsewhere, the importance of strict adherence to Party principles is also 
stressed, as in jednotný a principiální postup celého vedení strany (the 
united and principled forward march of the whole leadership of the Party) 
and principiální politika, heroismus a obětavost komunistů (the principled 
politics, heroism and self-sacrifice of Communists). The noun princip 
(principle) and its derivative principální (of principle), are found 25 times, 
while the near synonym zásada and its derivatives zásadní (of principle), 
zásadně (on principle) and zásadový (principled) occur sixteen times. The 
collocations základní principy (basic principles) and základní hodnoty 
(basic values) are cited thirteen times and seven times, respectively. 
 By contrast, the missed opportunities of the Dubček era are associated 
with equivocation and the absence of a consistent, disciplined and 
coordinated approach. This is evidenced by phrases such as slabost a 
nejednota polednového vedení (the weakness and disunity of the post-
January leadership), kolísaví členové strany (wavering members of the 
Party), straně chyběl jasný kurs a jednoznačná direktiva pro další postup 
(the Party lacked a clear course and an unambiguous directive for 
further progress), and uvolnění stranické kázně a celkové organizátorské 
práce strany a státu (an erosion of the discipline of the Party and the 
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entire organizational work of the Party and state).68 The importance 
of ‘consistency’ is denoted by expressions such as důsledné uplatňování 
vedoucí úlohy strany KSČ (consistent application of the leading role of 
the Party), and accentuated by the 35 occurrences of pevný (firm) and 
its derivatives, as in upevnit internacionální svazky se Sovětským svazem 
(to strengthen the international links with the Soviet Union). The 
adjective pevný is cited ten times, while its cognates, upevňovat/upevnit (to 
reinforce), upevnění/upevňování (consolidation), pevně (firmly), pevnost 
(resolution), and nepevný (unstable) are cited 25 times in total. According 
to SKT, pevný and its related forms were similarly prevalent throughout 
the entire socialist period. For left-wing Communists, firm central control 
was vital to maintaining Marxism-Leninism as a political philosophy, and 
legitimizing Soviet power and the international geopolitical status quo.
 From the perspective of the Brezhnev leadership, the continued 
subjugation of Czechoslovakia was essential to preserving the Soviet sphere 
of influence. However, it came at a considerable price. The attitude of 
Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union changed hugely as a result of the 
Warsaw Pact intervention. Established allusions to the Soviet Union as a 
friend and ally, such as jediný věrný spojenec Československa (the one true 
ally of Czechoslovakia) and spojenecký svazek se Sovětským svazem (the 
bond of alliance with the Soviet Union), now rang hollow, and phrases such 
as osvobození naší vlasti Sovětskou armádou (the liberation of our country 
by the Soviet army [in 1945]) lost much of their previous resonance. The 
prioritization of the role of the USSR amongst notional socialist equals, as 
in spolupráce se socialistickými zeměmi, a především se Sovětským svazem 
(collaboration with socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union) 
and naše svazky se socialistickými zeměmi, zejména se Sovětským svazem 
(our links with socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union), merely 
reinforced the sense of Soviet hegemony. All except the most orthodox of 
Communist believers saw the irony in terminology such as soudružská 
podpora i pomoc ke zvládnutí situace (comradely support and help in 
managing the situation) and akt internacionální solidarity (an act of 
international solidarity). As time went on, the phrase smlouva o dočasném 
pobytu sovětských vojsk v ČSSR (agreement on the temporary residence of 
Soviet troops in the ČSSR) sounded increasingly risible, especially given the 
promise in the TASS statement of 21 August 1968 that military units would 
be withdrawn ‘as soon as the emergent threat to the socialist achievements 
in Czechoslovakia, and the threat to the security of the countries of the 
68  The significance accorded to unity and discipline is addressed in ibid., pp. 43–55.
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socialist bloc, have been eliminated’.69 Even leading ex-Communists, such 
as Štrougal, have now conceded that the Party could have done more, 
particularly in the mid 1980s, to initiate a withdrawal.70 
 Many of the other references to Soviet influence employ pejorative 
prefixes to highlight manifestations of hostility. These include antisovětská 
platforma (anti-Soviet platform), protisovětská hysterie (anti-Soviet 
hysteria) and rafinovaný protisovětský projev (a sophisticated anti-Soviet 
speech). Perhaps the most explicit expressions of opposition to the Soviet 
Union identified in the text are the celebrations following Czechoslovakia’s 
victories over the USSR in the ice-hockey world championship in March 
1969, which resulted in damage to Aeroflot offices,71 and demonstrations to 
mark the first anniversary of the military intervention. The trickier matter 
of Jan Palach’s suicide (19 January 1969), in protest against the occupation, 
is explained away by sophistic dogmatic deduction: z psychózy vybičované 
mezi vysokoškoláky vzešla i osobní tragédie studenta Jana Palacha, za jehož 
smrt nesou představitelé pravice plnou politickou i morální odpovědnost (the 
psychosis whipped up among higher education students also resulted in the 
personal tragedy of the student Jan Palach, for whose death representatives 
of the right bear full political and moral responsibility).
 Several pages are devoted in Poučení to the official re-evaluation of 
the past and of socialist renewal. Particular significance is accorded to 
the Moscow Protocol ([moskevský] protokol) — a phrase cited seven times 
— which endorsed normalization on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, the 
re-establishment of the leading role of the Party, the elimination of ‘anti-
revolutionary’ organizations from political life and the strengthening of 
ties with the Soviet Union.72 Specifically, this meant the purge of ‘right-
wing’ Party members (especially the senior echelons in Prague); winning 
back the support (or, at least, regaining the passivity) of those fair-weather 
reformists who still merited the description of čestní komunisté a poctiví 
občané (honest Communists and decent citizens); the exposure of ‘Dubček’s 
two-faced politics’ (dvojaká tvář Dubčekovy politiky) and his removal from 
office; reasserting control over the mass media and other organs of state 
69  See Prohlášení šířené Tiskovou agenturou Sovětského svazu (TASS), 21 August 1968. 
Available at <http://www.rozhlas.cz/historie/1968/_zprava/prohlaseni-sirene-tiskovou-
agenturou-sovetskeho-svazu-tass--478466> [accessed 6 August 2013].
70  Lubomír Štrougal, Paměti a úvahy, Prague, 2008, p. 229.
71  The authorities used these incidents as a pretext for a crackdown on dissent. See, 
for example, Galya Golan, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubček Era, 1968–1969, 
Cambridge, 1973, pp. 297–98.
72  The Moscow Protocol, signed on 26 August 1968, annulled the results of the 
(extraordinary) 14th Congress of the KSČ, held in Vysočany on 22 August 1968.
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power; the suppression of all other forces which threatened democratic 
centralism; and redirecting economic development, with Soviet help, and 
in accordance with the Soviet model. 
 The text is explicit in its criticism of individual reform Communists, 
especially Josef Smrkovský, with fifteen citations; Oldřich Černík, eleven 
citations; František Kriegl, nine;73 Ota Šik, seven; Čestmír Císař, six, and 
Josef Špaček, six. The only leading public figure to retain at least a degree of 
respect from all sections of society was the distinguished non-Communist 
war veteran, Ludvík Svoboda (President of Czechoslovakia from March 
1968 to 28 May 1975), cited eight times, who was felt to be almost ‘above’ 
politics. Svoboda is described as velký vlastenec, hrdina protifašistického 
boje a významný představitel přátelství a spojenectví se SSSR (a great patriot, 
hero of the anti-fascist struggle and prominent representative of friendship 
and entente with the USSR).74 Acknowledgement of the role of individual 
hardline Communists is kept to a minimum, although Husák, cited ten 
times, is praised for his energy and steadfastness (perhaps in an attempt 
both to curry favour and to reinforce his resolve): ve vedení strany se velmi 
aktivně angažoval ([he] engaged very actively in the Party leadership) and 
do vědomí zdravého jádra strany […] se G. Husák zapsal svým pevným a 
smělým jednáním vůči kontrarevoluci a důsledně internacionalistickým 
postojem při řešení všech otázek (G. Husák came to the attention of the 
healthy core of the Party […] through his firm and courageous stance 
towards counter-revolution and his consistently internationalist attitude in 
solving all questions).75 
 The three further lexical groupings identified in the document — 
phrases in double inverted commas, expressions preceded by takzvaný/tzv. 
(so-called), and text highlighted in bold — all serve the purpose of drawing 
attention to a particular usage. In Poučení, inverted commas have at least 
eight specific (sometimes overlapping) functions: 1) to express irony, as 
identified by Young: „nový“, „lepší“ socialismus (‘new’, ‘better’ socialism); 
2) to reject the legitimacy of a term used by others in a different sense, as 
in „konzervatismus“ (‘conservatism’) to define adherence to ultra-leftist 
views; 3) to denote authorial distance from a concept, as in další „teorie“ o 
73  Kriegl was the only member of the Party leadership present at the Moscow 
negotiations (23–26 August 1968) who refused to sign the Moscow Protocol. He was 
subsequently one of the first signatories of Charter 77.
74  Svoboda’s role in the imposition of normalization has been strongly criticized by 
historians such as Jiří Pernes, Takoví nám vládli, Prague, 2010.
75  Husák had initially expressed opposition to the ‘internationalist’ solution of military 
intervention.
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nutnosti vnitřního rozkládání vedoucí úlohy strany (further ‘theories’ about 
the necessity of the internal breakdown of the leading role of the Party); 4) 
to highlight the fact that a phrase has entered into popular parlance, as in 
„muži ledna“; 5) to signal non-standard usage, as in „odstřel“ funkcionářů 
(the ‘culling’ of functionaries); 6) to indicate a change in stylistic register, as 
in „kdo s koho“; 7) to cite slogans and rallying cries, such as heslo „národní 
jednota“ (the slogan of ‘national unity’) and „všenárodní vlastenecké hnutí“ 
(‘all-nation patriotic movement’), and 8) to quote directly or indirectly, as 
in pravicoví představitelé ve vedení strany ujišťovali veřejnost, že je „všechno 
v pořádku” (right-wing representatives in the Party assured the public that 
‘everything is OK’). 
 The phrase takzvaný/tzv. (so-called) occurs seventeen times in the 
text, once in conjunction with inverted commas, in the fifth sense 
identified above: požadavek na svolání mimořádného, tzv. „kádrového“ 
sjezdu (demand for convening an extraordinary, so-called ‘Party members’’ 
congress). The principal function of takzvaný/tzv. is to undermine the 
validity of a given notion. It thus generally fulfils a similar role to inverted 
commas in one or more of the first, second and third senses above, as in 
tzv. obrodný proces (the so-called renewal process), opoziční, tzv. druhé 
centrum ve straně (the opposition, so-called second centre in the Party) and 
skupiny tzv. progresivistů (groups of so-called progressives). Elsewhere, it 
broadly equates to the fourth sense above, as in tzv. československá otázka 
(the so-called Czechoslovak question), and at least once it qualifies a 
slogan: pod heslem tzv. vlastní tvář Čs. zahraniční politiky (under the slogan 
of Czechoslovakia’s so-called independent [literally ‘own-face’] foreign 
policy).76
 The use of bold type, in keeping with Czech journalistic convention, 
is intended to impart gravitas to certain key passages and ideas, but it is 
so arbitrary and ill-judged in Poučení that it contributes virtually nothing 
to the reader’s engagement with or understanding of the document. 
Sometimes, the highlighted text may summarize a significant point 
or development, as in Ústřední výbor proto považuje Akční program za 
nesprávný a neplatný dokument, z něhož nelze vycházet v teoretické činnosti 
i praktické politice strany (The Central Committee therefore regards the 
Action Programme to be an incorrect and invalid document which cannot 
be applied to the theoretical activities and practical policies of the Party). 
On occasion, however, it looks like the work of an editor with no interest 
in the subject matter; see, for example, page 26, where the text V politickém 
76  The possible allusion to ‘socialism with a human face’ is lost in translation.
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systému Československé socialistické republiky (In the political system of 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) appears in bold, followed by normal 
type face. After the first two-thirds of Poučení, the highlighting disappears 
altogether, as if in recognition of its functional redundancy.
Keywords, cluster types and collocations
Statistically, the top ten non-function word groups in Poučení all relate 
to topics typical of Communist speak, especially politics (strana [P/
party], socialismus [socialism], pravice [the right], politik [politician], 
vedení [leadership], komunista [Communist], ÚV [Central Committee], 
sily [forces]), the notion of collective affiliation (Československo 
[Czechoslovakia]), and the role of labour (práce [work]). Expressions 
containing the concept of the ‘party’ are cited 479 times, and amount to 
nearly 2.5% of all the vocabulary items in the text (including function 
words). The noun strana is the highest-ranking lexical word, with 285 
citations, even if its derivatives and abbreviated and compound forms are 
excluded. Strana is similarly the most common lexical word in SKT. By 
comparison, in the authoritative corpus-based frequency dictionary of 
Czech, Frekvenční slovník češtiny, in which the meanings of homonyms 
are not disambiguated, strana has an average reduced frequency rank of 
75.77 Other politically motivated terms which feature in the top ten lexical 
words in both SKT and Poučení are práce (work), ranked third and ninth, 
respectively, and socialistický (socialist), ranked fifth and sixth (in its 
adjectival form only), respectively. By contrast, pravice and its derivatives 
are considerably less common in SKT than Poučení, although they occur 
much more frequently in SKT in the texts from 1969 and 1977 than from 
1952. The figures for the noun pravice are: 1952 — 3 ppm, 1969 — 56, 1977 — 
50. The ‘right’ was the preferred enemy in the early normalization period, 
because it tarred all the opposition with the same brush, and avoided being 
specific. 
77  František Čermák, Michal Křen et al., Frekvenční slovník češtiny, Prague, 2004. 
Average reduced frequency is a measure of ‘intuitive commonness’, based both on the 
frequency of a word in the corpus and on its distribution within the corpus. 
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Table 1. The Top Ten Lexical Word Groups in Poučení
Lexical groups   Rank  Citations
strana (285 citations) (P/party), stranický (38) (party [adj.]),    1   479
nestraník (2) (non-party member), 
vnitrostranický (2) (intra-party), 
protistranický (10) (anti-party [adj.]), KSČ (121), 
KSS (7) / KS Slovenska (5) (Communist Party of Slovakia), 
KSSS (9) (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)78
socialismus (67) (socialism), socialistický (111) (socialist),     2   220
protisocialistický (25) / antisocialistický (17) (anti-socialist)
pravice (73) (the right), pravicový (79) (right-wing),      3   182
pravicově (24) (right-wing [adv.]), pravičák (5) (right-winger), 
pravičácký (1) ([of a] right-winger [adj.])
politik (20) (politician), politika (11) (politics, policies),      4=   126
politický (86) (political), politicky (4) (politically), 
politickoideový (2) (political and ideological), 
vnitropolitický (3) (internal political)
vedení (63) (leadership), vedený (1) (led),         4=   126
vedoucí (leading) (38), vést (to lead) (24)79
Československo (49) (Czechoslovakia),          6   114
československý (26) (Czechoslovak), Čs./ čs. (11) (Cz.), 
ČSSR (28) (the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic)
komunista (29) (a Communist), komunismus (4) (Communism),   7   99
Komunistický / komunistický (46) (Communist), 
nekomunista (1) (a non-Communist), 
antikomunismus (3) (anti-Communism), 
antikomunistický (10) / protikomunistický (6) (anti-Communist)
ÚV (Central Committee)         8   94
práce (33) (work), (do-) (roz-) (vy-) (z-)pracovat (8) (to work    9   82
[with various prefixes denoting shades of meaning]), 
pracující (37) (worker), pracovní (2) (work [adj.]), 
pracovník (1) (worker), spolupracovník (1) (co-worker)
síla (1) (strength), síly (66) (forces), silný (4) (strong),      10   81
sílící (1) (strengthening [adj.]), posílit (2) / 
zesilovat (1) (to strengthen), posílení (6) (strengthening)
78  This figure excludes ten instances where strana does not mean ‘party’.
79  The verb vést collocates eleven times with k (to lead to), twice with útok (to lead an 
attack), twice with zápas (to lead a fight) and once with boj (to lead a battle).
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 The themes of belonging and collective identity are significant in 
a one-party, largely monocultural state,80 as evidenced by the relative 
frequency of společnost (society), společenský (social/societal), společenství 
(partnership), cited 70 times; národ (nation), národní (national), národně 
(national[ly]), 64; stát, (state), státní (state [adj.]), 58; and země (country), 
58, including sixteen times in the collocation naše země (our country). 
Poučení draws a clear distinction between ‘us’ (Czechs and Slovaks and 
our allies, the common people, and the ‘healthy core’ of the Party) and 
‘them’ (perfidious Westerners, relics of the bourgeois past, and reform 
Communists). Interestingly, the function word náš (our), which has a much 
broader semantic range than English ‘our’, occurs 122 times, especially in 
phrases such as náš lid (our [= the Czech and Slovak] people) and naše 
společnost (our [= Czechoslovak] society). It is the twentieth most common 
lemma in SKT. Also cited eight times is the phrase u nás (cf. German ‘bei 
uns’, French ‘chez nous’), which can cover a number of meanings, but 
here tends to mean ‘in our country’. Nevertheless, the notions of national, 
regional and state affiliation were strictly circumscribed by socialist reality. 
All concepts of belonging were theoretically subordinate to the principle of 
socialist internationalism, which, in practical terms, meant that they were 
subject to the economic and political constraints of Soviet foreign policy.81 
 The centrality of the theme of work in the Communist schema 
is constantly highlighted in the text — in addition to 82 citations of 
práce and its derivatives, there are 33 citations of the more overtly 
socialist-sounding terms dělník (worker), dělnický (workers’) and dělnictví 
(working-classness). Semantically related lexical groups, such as činnost 
(activity), čin (act), činitel (public servant), součinnost (cooperation), 
cited 44 times, and funkce (function), funkcionář (functionary), cited 
27 times, also feature prominently. Other politically motivated word 
groups with a high frequency include Sovětský/sovětský/-sovětský (Soviet), 
protisovětský/antisovětský (anti-Soviet), antisovětismus (anti-Sovietism), 
with 60 citations; třída (class), třídní (class [adj.]), 59; internacionalismus 
(internationalism), internacionalistický (internationalist), internacionál 
(international [noun]), internacionální/mezinárodní (international), 
57;82 marxismus-leninismus (Marxism-Leninism), marxisticko-leninský 
80  The distinction between Czechs and Slovaks is of limited relevance here because of 
their historical and cultural commonalities.
81  For an in-depth analysis of the limitations of sovereignty, see Waller, The Language 
of Communism, pp. 144–47.
82  The adjective mezinárodní, cited sixteen times, is the semantically more neutral of 
the two.
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(Marxist-Leninist), 49; orgán (organ), 43; člen (member), členský (member 
[adj.]), členství (membership), and other derivatives, 40; organizace 
(organization), organizační (organizational), (z-)organizovat (to organize), 
and other derivatives, 37; moc/mocnost (power), mocenský (of power]), 33; 
ideologie (ideology), ideologický (ideological), ideologicky (ideologically), 
31; úloha (role), 30; and s./soudruh (comrade), soudružský (comradely), 30.83 
The fact that the same buzzwords are repeated is not in itself surprising in a 
text of this nature.84 Repetition is a major element of political rhetoric, and 
can be highly effective, if used judiciously. However, in Poučení much of it 
is redundant, and seeks to harangue and traduce, rather than to persuade. 
Far from engaging the reader, it contributes significantly to the ‘heaviness’ 
of Communist speak, as identified by Thom.85 The hardliners chose not to 
make stylistic concessions, since to do so would be to introduce precisely 
the type of nuance and more complex perspective that they were seeking 
to eradicate. 
 As in all forms of discourse, the words used derive much of their 
meaning and perlocutionary force from their co-occurrence with other 
lexemes. For example, of the twelve citations of hnutí (movement), ten are 
preceded by komunistické (Communist); of the 24 citations of the adverb 
pravicově, seventeen are followed by oportunistický (opportunist) and two 
by revizionistický (revisionist); and of the eighteen citations of bratrský 
(fraternal), fourteen are followed by strana and two by země. Like pravice 
and its cognates, oportunismus and revizionismus and their cognates are 
more widely used in the later socialist period than in the early 1950s, on 
the evidence presented in SKT. Statistically less common, but nevertheless 
striking, are the four instances of the expression frakční činnost (factional 
activity); the co-occurrence, twice in four-word phrases, of mírový 
(peaceful),86 pokojný (quiet) and práce (work); and the four examples 
of chyby (mistakes) and nedostatky (shortcomings) within one word of 
each other. Even more noteworthy is the excessively stylized collocation 
poctiví občané (honourable citizens), cited six times, in each case to 
denote opponents of reform, which may have unwittingly left its mark on 
83  There are no citations of soudružka (female comrade), and there is barely any 
mention of women throughout the document. Czechoslovak politics in the 1960s was 
dominated by men.
84  Ant Conc records 5,308 word types, but this figure is misleadingly high because it 
treats each inflected form of a headword as a discrete type.
85  Thom, Newspeak, pp. 21–22.
86  Young, Totalitarian Language, p. 189, has described ‘peace’ as ‘perhaps the mostly 
widely used god-term in Soviet propaganda since the Second World War’.
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subsequent usage. In SYN 2010, poctiví občané is found just three times in 
the nominative case, whereas the more neutral-sounding slušní lidé (decent 
people) occurs 94 times.87 The reiteration of stock phrases and cluster 
types, such as poctiví občané, serves to reinforce their status as immutable 
concepts, thereby helping to redefine the parameters of the political debate.
 It is even more difficult to assess the statistical significance of the 
frequency of collocations in a propagandistic document such as Poučení 
than to establish the likely occurrence and importance of lexemes and their 
derivatives.88 Sometimes, where a phrase has become a fixed expression 
and/or is critical to the development of the discourse, even a large 
number of citations may be unremarkable, as with ústřední výbor (central 
committee), mentioned 34 times. Elsewhere, as few as four citations may 
exceed probability, especially where one or more of the elements does not 
feature prominently in the standard lexicon, as with frakční činnost, (found 
just five times in SYN 2010). Suffice it to say, the more unusual a recurrent 
collocation is, the more conspicuous it appears, and the greater its impact 
is likely to be. 
 In Poučení, repetition is often combined with hyperbole or emotive 
vocabulary to impress on the reader the gravity of a given situation or the 
importance of a particular point. The adjective velký (big, great) and its 
comparative form větší occur 28 times in the document, while rozhodující/
rozhodný/rozhodně (decisive/decisively), hlavní (main), významný/
významně (significant/significantly) and značný/značně (considerable/
considerably) are found 34, 19, 15 and 14 and times, respectively. Marxism-
Leninism and the Communist Party are associated with positive superlatives 
such as nejprogresivnější ideologie (the most progressive ideology), nejlepší 
a nejpokrokovější kulturní hodnoty (the best and most advanced cultural 
values), nejušlechtilejší tužby a cíle (the most noble aspirations and aims) 
and odkaz nejlepších synů strany, K. Gottwalda, (the legacy of the best 
sons of the Party, of K. Gottwald [President of Czechoslovakia, from 1948 
to 1953]).89 Other ‘left-wing’ qualities stressed in the document include 
certainty, endeavour, efficacy, courage and self-sacrifice: politické i právní 
jistoty občanů (the political and legal certainties of citizens), cílevědomě 
rozvíjené úsilí marxisticko-leninských sil (the tenaciously developed efforts 
87  By way of further comparison, slušní občané (decent citizens) and poctiví lidé 
(honourable people) are cited nine and ten times, respectively.
88  The text is too short and too narrowly focused to yield, say, meaningful T-scores or 
MI-scores.
89  Gottwald was a ruthless Stalinist, but as the first ‘worker president’ he was immune 
from serious criticism.
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of the Marxist-Leninist forces) and statečný a obětavý boj (courageous and 
sacrificial struggle). There is no room for equivocation, relativism or self-
doubt in the world-view of the orthodox ‘believers’, and apparently less still 
for modesty and humility. 
 In contrast with the ‘left’, the ‘right’ is identified with expressive negative 
epithets, such as krize, krizový [adj.] (crisis), nebezpečná činnost (dangerous 
activity), ovzduší nejistoty (an atmosphere of uncertainty), vyzývavost a 
troufalost (provocation and cheek) and zrada socialismu (the betrayal of 
socialism). Unsurprisingly, according to SKT, krize and its derivatives were 
far more common in the post-1968 lexicon than in the early 1950s, whereas 
the noun zrada (betrayal), cited once in Poučení, was more prevalent in 
the Stalinist period. While krize conveyed exactly the image of 1968 that 
the Party wanted to fix in people’s minds, zrada was perhaps generally 
felt to be too uncompromising and too reminiscent of the language of the 
show trials. The latter was also problematic because many ordinary people 
associated the term specifically with the conduct of the hard left, and more 
especially with the signatories of the invitation letter, whom they dubbed 
zrádci (traitors). 
 The right is directly blamed for the erosion of the authority of the Party 
and the socialist system, as in postupný rozklad řídící struktury strany 
(the gradual disintegration of the regulatory structure of the Party) and 
rozklad socialistické moci (the disintegration of socialist power). Amongst 
the sub-groups allegedly under the sway of the ‘right’, and targeted for 
trenchant criticism in Poučení, are the media, the Municipal Committee 
of the KSČ in Prague, the Catholic Church in Slovakia, the intelligentsia 
(especially in the humanities) and writers. (Unsurprisingly, there are no 
allusions to the extraordinary flowering of Czech culture in the 1960s, 
since this represented a critical response to the values of socialist realism, 
which had formed a major part of the hardliners’ cultural repertoire.) 
Činátl has pointed out that the text blames the ‘right’, in the aftermath 
of the occupation, for unleashing ‘an elemental and uncontrollable 
process’, which served to disorientate ordinary people, as evidenced 
by the phrases lavina šovinismu (avalanche of chauvinism) and smršť 
šovinistické demagogie (tornado of chauvinistic demagogy).90 The theme 
of natural phenomena is reinforced by the lexical group živel (element), 
živelný (elemental), živelnost (elemental force), cited nineteen times, as 
in protisocialistické živly (anti-socialist elements) and nebezpečí živelnosti 
polednového vývoje (the danger of the elemental force of the post-January 
90  Činátl, Téma, p. 5. 
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development). The fact that the events had a life force of their own, which 
swept people along in spite of themselves, strengthens the ‘get-out clause’ 
for those who choose to re-evaluate the past. The reference to natural 
processes also has echoes of the ‘organic metaphor’, identified by Thom as 
central to Communist ideology, which moves from ‘the biological world 
to the world of morality’.91 Yet, for many Czechs and Slovaks, appelations 
such as kontrarevoluční živly (counter-revolutionary elements), cited six 
times, were downright provocative, since they implicitly stripped them 
of their humanity. This was demonstrated most clearly in January 1989, 
during ‘Palach Week’, when the crowds turned against the authorities 
with chants of My nejsme živly! (We are not elements!) and Kde máte ty 
živly? (Show us these elements, then!; literally ‘Where do you have these 
elements?’).
 Other miscellaneous lexical items which occur mainly in disparaging 
collocations include různý (different), and its superlative form nejrůznější, 
cited fifteen times, as in různí oportunisté a kariéristé (various opportunists 
and careerists); platforma (platform), cited nine times, as in ucelená 
antisovětská platforma (comprehensive anti-Soviet platform); and heslo, 
also cited nine times, as in pseudovlastenecké výzvy a hesla (pseudo-patriotic 
appeals and slogans). Overall, more words are employed in a negative than 
a positive context, with the result that the document has the tone of a 
hectoring lament rather than an upbeat evaluation of the successes of the 
past and hopes for the future. The authors of Poučení arguably had little 
choice but to focus on castigating their opponents since, in the absence of 
widespread support, their very legitimacy depended on taking control of 
meaning and promoting the irreconcilability of antithetical forces. 
Conclusion
If, in early 1971, anyone still had doubts about the future direction of 
Czechoslovak society, they needed to look no further than Poučení to 
confirm (or in some cases, perhaps, to allay) their fears. Granted, the 
document did not predict the precise details of real socialism, such as the 
role that officially santioned low-level consumerism and populist culture 
would play in promoting acquiescence. Nor did it anticipate that people’s 
growing disillusionment with the system would result in such large-scale 
disengagement from public life.92 It did, however, make the parameters of 
91  Thom, Newspeak, pp. 32–38.
92  The disengagement took various forms, including escaping to weekend houses and 
country cottages (chataření and chalupáření), joining specialist (overtly non-political) 
organizations, such as folk ensembles, and building family homes, especially in villages.
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the post-1968 discourse abundantly clear, and it symbolically reaffirmed 
the authority of the orthodox wing of the Party. For all its stylistic flaws and 
other weaknesses, the text contributed to the re-establishment of, what has 
been aptly termed by some political scientists, a logocracy or orthogloxy — 
rule by the manipulation of the word.93 Biľak and his co-authors were little 
troubled by the finer nuances of language or the subtleties of the truth, and 
were not even particularly exercised by the question of how best to win 
over hearts and minds. Their overriding motivations were to re-impress 
on the population, in unambiguous terms, that there was no alternative 
to Marxism-Leninism, and to show to Moscow that they had understood 
the ‘lessons’ of 1968. Poučení was significant not because it said anything 
particularly interesting or original, but because of the authority vested in 
it by the ruling elite, and because of the perlocutionary force that it derived 
from people’s real-world knowledge and other texts in the public domain. 
 In the dogmatists’ narrow terms of reference, Poučení was at least a 
partial success. It served to delimit the scope of the investigation into the 
past; it identified appropriate scapegoats; it issued a further reminder to 
would-be reformists that their plans had been thwarted; it silenced less 
strident voices in the Party; it removed scope for alternative interpretations; 
it produced an ideological blueprint for future conformity; and, critically, 
it gained the approval of the Kremlin by ticking all the right political 
boxes. Kieran Williams has pointed out that ‘The Soviets were delighted 
with the outcome of 1970, in particular the adoption in December of the 
Lessons […]’.94 Amongst the major themes that the text accentuated were 
the importance of the leading role of the Party, the need for Communist 
discipline and resolve, the continued challenge to socialism from the 
bourgeoisie, the dangers posed by revisionism, the inviolability of socialist 
internationalism (that is, the unbreakable bond between the USSR and 
its Warsaw Pact allies), and the imperative of military intervention. Its 
greatest achievement, from the perspective of the hardliners, was that it 
enshrined their victory over Dubček and his supporters, and reasserted the 
rigid norms of Communist stylistics and semantics. 
 Poučení was the rare combination of a document with few discernible 
merits, but with considerable impact factor. Far from all of its impact, 
93  See, for example, Mikhail Heller, Cogs in the Soviet Wheel: The Formation of Soviet 
Man, London, 1988, pp. 273–74, translated by David Floyd; Wolf Moskovich, ‘Planned 
Language Change in Russian since 1917’, in Michael Kirkwood (ed.), Language Planning 
in the Soviet Union, London, 1989, pp. 85–99 (p. 88), and Luciano Pellicani, Revolutionary 
Apocalypse: Ideological Roots of Terrorism, Westport, CT, 2003, pp. 234–35.
94  Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, Cambridge, 1997, p. 248. 
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however, could be construed as positive. It proved an endless source of 
frustration both to teachers and pupils, who not only had to cope with the 
turgid style, hackneyed themes and formulaic approach, but also had to 
provide the ‘correct’ replies to unanswerable questions, based on highly 
suspect propositions, such as ‘Why is the leading role of the working 
class and the Communist Party the main guarantor of socialism in every 
socialist country?’95 The publication may have alienated more readers 
from Marxism-Leninism than it converted to the cause, and it almost 
certainly undermined Czechoslovakia’s post-war progressive consensus 
and egalitarian ethos. In terms of intra-Party politics, it stifled debate, 
promoted complacency, and led to the further entrenchment of the 
‘conservative’ faction both amongst the hierarchy and at a regional level. 
More damaging still for advocates of reform socialism, it negated the spirit 
of the Prague Spring, and helped to engender an atmosphere of cynicism 
and apathy. Even today, Poučení stands for many as a potent reminder of 
the dashed hopes, despair and distortions of the normalization era.
95  School edition, p. 24 (see note 8).
